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FEAR AND LOATHING OF CLASS ACTION 
ARBITRATION, OR HOW TO DISMISS THE 
EFFECTIVE VINDICATION DOCTRINE 
Mark Bolin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Civil claims have long served a dual role of compensating 
consumers while deterring wrongful conduct.1 Some federal claims 
are so important as a deterrent that courts consider them to be an 
integral part of the government’s enforcement regime.2 For example, 
the Sherman Act has long provided for private enforcement of 
antitrust claims in order to supplement the Department of Justice’s 
(DOJ) efforts.3 However, the courts cannot fulfill either of these roles 
if consumers lack incentives to bring their claims in the first place. 
This issue is common with small and negative value claims,4 in 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science, 
University of California, Santa Barbara, June 2008. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, 
Professor Hiro Aragaki, for his invaluable advice, as well as the editors of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review for their hard work throughout the editing process. I could not have written 
this Comment without their help.  
 1. See Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 n.10 (1982) 
(“Congress created the treble-damages remedy . . . precisely for the purpose of encouraging 
private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to 
the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and 
deterring violations.” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979))).  
 2. See, e.g., Reiter, 442 U.S. at 344. 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see also Reiter, 442 U.S. at 344 (“Congress created the treble-
damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust 
violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available 
to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations. Indeed, 
nearly 20 times as many private antitrust actions are currently pending in the federal courts as 
actions filed by the Department of Justice.”). 
 4. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1760 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). “Negative value claims” are claims in which plaintiffs must spend more to prevail 
than they could potentially receive if they prevail. 
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which the defendant seeks to profit by targeting many individuals for 
small sums of money.5 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the 
Supreme Court held that American Express could require customers 
to arbitrate claims individually even if the cost of arbitration was far 
more than what any individual plaintiff could expect to recover.6 
However, in reaching that conclusion, the Court paid little attention 
to the central issue of the case: whether the arbitration clause violates 
the effective vindication doctrine by denying the plaintiffs any means 
at all to pursue their claims. Instead, the Court focused narrowly on 
whether an arbitration clause can ban class action arbitration, a 
question it had already decided.7 Consequently, the Court has further 
limited the ability of customers to successfully bring small and 
negative value claims against creative corporate wrongdoers. Simply 
put, the Court’s holding is a betrayal of its precedent, becoming the 
most recent addition to a long line of cases aimed at limiting the 
availability of class actions to plaintiffs.8 
This Comment argues that Italian Colors allows corporations to 
effectively insulate themselves from liability for wrongful conduct 
that results in only small-dollar claims through creative use of class 
action arbitration waivers. Part II describes the procedural history of 
the case and the Court’s analysis. Part III discusses the rationale 
behind the Court’s holding and explores its implications for private 
enforcement. Finally, Part IV concludes with a summary of the 
realities of class action arbitration waivers in light of Italian Colors. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Lower Court History 
In 2006, Italian Colors Restaurant and a number of other New 
York and California businesses (“Plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit against 
American Express for violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
 
 5. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic 
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a 
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
 6. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). 
 7. Id. at 2312 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743). 
 8. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1429 (2013); Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1753. 
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Act.9 Plaintiffs alleged that American Express used its monopoly 
power to impose certain terms on them in its Card Acceptance 
Agreement (the “Agreement”).10 One of the provisions of the 
Agreement that Plaintiffs alleged violated the Sherman Act was its 
collective action waiver arbitration clause.11 The clause required all 
claims related to it to be arbitrated on an individual—not class-
wide—basis.12 
Plaintiffs argued that the clause was unenforceable because it 
insulated American Express from liability by prohibiting Plaintiffs 
from sharing their arbitration costs.13 Plaintiffs submitted testimony 
from a professional economist with substantial experience in 
individual and class action antitrust litigation that stated that proving 
their claims would cost somewhere between hundreds of thousands 
and a million dollars.14 Individually, however, Plaintiffs could not 
expect to recover more than $5,000 each on average.15 Plaintiffs 
argued that the substantial cost of proving their antitrust claims in 
relation to the small sum recoverable meant that no individual 
plaintiff would pursue its case against American Express.16 
The district court rejected this argument and required Plaintiffs 
to submit to arbitration.17 The court reasoned that the alleged high 
cost of proving Plaintiffs’ claims did not insulate American Express 
from liability because Plaintiffs could potentially recover much more 
than the $5,000 they claimed.18 The court pointed out that Section 4 
of the Clayton Act allows plaintiffs with antitrust claims to recover 
 
 9. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 03 CV 9592 (GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006), rev’d and remanded sub nom. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 
F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2304. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at *2. Plaintiffs also argued that American Express imposed a tying arrangement 
upon them whereby merchants who chose to accept American Express charge cards had to also 
accept American Express credit cards. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at *4–5. 
 14. Id. at *5. 
 15. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
 16. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 2006 WL 662341, at *5. 
 17. Id. at *10. 
 18. Id. at *5. 
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treble damages and the costs of suit, which would presumably 
include the cost of any expert opinion.19 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Plaintiffs renewed their 
argument that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it 
effectively insulated American Express from liability.20 This time, 
the court agreed.21 First, the court noted that the district court’s 
reasoning that Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for the 
compensation of Plaintiffs’ litigation costs failed to account for an 
important limiting principle.22 In awarding litigation costs to 
plaintiffs under the Clayton Act, courts are severely limited by 
federal statute.23 The applicable statute currently allows for a mere 
$40 per diem award, which would not be nearly enough to cover the 
expert’s fees.24 Furthermore, the district court’s reasoning did not 
take any account of what would happen if Plaintiffs lost. In such a 
case, Plaintiffs would recoup none of their costs.25 Relying on the 
effective vindication doctrine first articulated in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,26 the court held that the 
arbitration clause was unenforceable because it effectively denied 
Plaintiffs the opportunity to vindicate their claims.27 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Second 
Circuit’s judgment in light of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.,28 remanding for further consideration.29 On 
reconsideration, the Second Circuit held that Stolt-Nielsen S.A. did 
not change its analysis and again reversed the district court’s 
judgment.30 However, the Second Circuit placed a hold on its 
mandate in order to allow American Express to file a petition seeking 
 
 19. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (stating that any person injured by violation of 
antitrust law shall recover threefold damages and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee). 
 20. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d at 311. 
 21. Id. at 319. 
 22. Id. at 317–18. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 318 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (2012)). 
 25. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (providing recovery for only successful litigants). 
 26. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 27. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d at 319. 
 28. 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 29. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401, 2401 (2010). 
 30. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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writ of certiorari.31 While its mandate was on hold, the Supreme 
Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,32 which held that 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted a California judge-
made law that class action arbitration waivers were per se 
unconscionable.33 In light of Concepcion both parties filed additional 
briefing with the Second Circuit.34 It subsequently reconsidered its 
opinion and again affirmed its judgment, finding that Concepcion did 
not affect its analysis.35 
On November 9, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.36 
The question the Court posed to the parties was whether a 
contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the FAA 
when the plaintiffs’ cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory 
claim exceeds the potential recovery.37 
B.  Supreme Court Decision 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
Justice Scalia’s brief majority opinion began with a description 
of the FAA’s mandate to “‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration 
agreements according to their terms” absent a contrary congressional 
command.38 He then concluded that there was no contrary 
congressional command, either in the FAA or Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23—which establishes the requirements for class action 
treatment—that compelled the Court to invalidate the Agreement’s 
arbitration clause.39 He noted that neither Rule 23 nor the FAA 
entitled Plaintiffs’ claims to class action treatment and in fact 
imposed stringent requirements on class action certification.40 This 
observation did not end his analysis, however, because even without 
 
 31. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 32. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 33. Id. at 1753; In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d at 206. 
 34. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d at 206. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
 37. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307 (2013). 
 38. Id. at 2309 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 2310. 
FEAR AND LOATHING 9/29/2014 10:51 AM 
568 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:563 
 
a contrary congressional command, the clause would have been 
unenforceable if it had violated the effective vindication doctrine.41 
Justice Scalia began his discussion of the effective vindication 
doctrine that originated in Mitsubishi by noting that it was not a part 
of that case’s holding and was therefore dicta.42 Mitsubishi 
concerned a sales agreement between Mitsubishi Motors Corporation 
(“Mitsubishi”) and a Puerto Rican corporation, Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. (“Soler”).43 The sales agreement mandated that Soler 
sell a certain number of Mitsubishi automobiles every month while 
requiring all claims arising out of the sales agreement to be settled by 
arbitration in Japan.44 After Soler’s sales of its Mitsubishi 
automobiles began to decline, it told Mitsubishi it would not accept 
the number of vehicles required by the sales agreement.45 Mitsubishi 
subsequently moved to compel Soler to appear before arbitration 
proceedings in Japan based on its claim that Soler had violated the 
terms of the agreement.46 
Soler also counterclaimed for violations of the Sherman Act.47 
In its opposition to Mitsubishi’s motion to compel arbitration, Soler 
argued that its antitrust claims were inappropriate for arbitration 
abroad.48 According to Soler, private antitrust claims are too 
important to entrust to arbitrators abroad who have no exposure to 
American laws or values.49 The Court in Mitsubishi rejected this 
argument, but noted that if Soler had established that it could not 
vindicate its rights because of the arbitration clause it would be 
unenforceable.50 According to Justice Scalia, the Court’s qualifying 
statement was not a part of its holding, and was therefore dictum.51 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued that since Mitsubishi, the 
Court has interpreted the doctrine as giving plaintiffs only the right 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1985). 
 44. Id. at 617. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 618–19. 
 47. Id. at 619–20. 
 48. See id. at 632. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013). 
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to pursue their claims, not an affordable means of proving them.52 
For example, in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,53 
the Court concluded that a filing fee that was so onerous that it 
effectively prevented plaintiffs from bringing their case at all would 
violate the effective vindication doctrine.54 In Randolph, Larketta 
Randolph brought a claim for violation of the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) against the 
lienholder of her mobile home loan, Green Tree Financial 
Corporation (“Green Tree”).55 Green Tree then moved to compel 
arbitration of Randolph’s claims in accordance with the parties’ loan 
installment contract.56 In response, Randolph argued that the 
agreement’s arbitration clause was unenforceable because it failed to 
protect her from potentially high arbitration costs.57 
The Court rejected this argument, holding that an arbitration 
clause is not unenforceable merely because it is silent on the issue of 
arbitration costs and fees.58 In order to render an arbitration clause 
unenforceable, the Court stated, a movant would have to establish 
that it faced more than a mere “risk” of prohibitively costly 
arbitration.59 According to Justice Scalia, a filing fee like the one in 
Randolph would implicate the effective vindication doctrine because 
it would prohibit Plaintiffs from even accessing the courts.60 This, he 
contended, is materially different from an arbitration clause that 
merely makes proving a claim unaffordable but leaves a plaintiff at 
least ostensible access to the courts.61 
Justice Scalia cited two cases in further support of his argument 
that the FAA’s preference for arbitration means the Agreement’s 
collective action arbitration waiver should be enforced. First, he 
noted that in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,62 the Court 
upheld an arbitration clause even though the relevant statute, the Age 
 
 52. Id. at 2310–11. 
 53. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 54. Id. at 90. 
 55. Id. at 82–83. 
 56. Id. at 83. 
 57. Id. at 89. 
 58. Id. at 91. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013). 
 61. Id. at 2311. 
 62. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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Discrimination in Employment Act,63 expressly allowed for 
collective actions.64 The Court also upheld the arbitration agreement 
at issue in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,65 in 
spite of the plaintiff’s argument that it violated the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act by lessening the liability of carriers for damaged goods.66 
According to Justice Scalia, these cases stand for the proposition that 
a class action arbitration waiver does not deny any party the 
opportunity to effectively vindicate their claims merely by virtue of 
the fact that it limits arbitration to the two contracting parties.67 
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s recent decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion all but decides the case in 
American Express’s favor.68 Concepcion held that the FAA 
preempted a California judicial doctrine that considered class action 
arbitration waivers per se unconscionable.69 The Court concluded 
that the purpose of the FAA was to encourage the speedy resolution 
of claims through an informal arbitration process and that any 
requirement that arbitration be able to proceed on a class-wide basis 
was contrary to that intent.70 
In his Italian Colors concurrence, Justice Thomas affirmed the 
position he took in Concepcion that the FAA only allows arbitration 
clauses to be invalidated when there was some defect in their 
formation, such as fraud or duress.71 Justice Thomas contended that 
Plaintiffs argued the arbitration clause was invalid on two grounds: 
(1) it “would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws,” and (2) it 
would prevent the effective vindication of their statutory rights.72 He 
concluded that the Court must, therefore, enforce the arbitration 
clause because Plaintiffs did not even allege a defect in the formation 
of the clause.73 
 
 63. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006). 
 64. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
 65. 515 U.S. 528 (1995). 
 66. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A., 515 U.S. 
at 530). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 2312. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. at 2312–13. 
 73. Id. at 2313. 
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2.  The Dissent 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice Kagan’s dissent.74 
The dissent rested on the argument that the Agreement’s arbitration 
clause is invalid because it prevented the effective vindication of 
Plaintiffs’ claims.75 According to the dissent, the practical effect of 
the Court’s ruling is to require Italian Colors Restaurant to bear all of 
the costs of arbitration by itself despite the fact that its individual 
claims cost far more to prove than it could possibly collect in 
damages.76 This can only mean that American Express altogether 
eludes liability for antitrust violations relating to the Agreement 
because not only would no reasonable plaintiff pursue such a claim, 
but no reasonable attorney would take it.77 
Justice Kagan’s dissent first took aim at the majority’s statement 
that the effective vindication doctrine “originated as dictum.”78 The 
dissent stated that the effective vindication doctrine as applied in 
Mitsubishi was a central part of its holding and has subsequently 
been referenced in cases such as Randolph and Gilmer.79 Therefore, 
while it may have originated as dictum in Mitsubishi, it has since 
become a principle the Court has consulted when a party alleges that 
another party has insulated itself from liability.80 
The dissent next addressed the majority’s contention that the 
effective vindication doctrine did not apply to the Agreement’s 
arbitration clause because it did not prevent Plaintiffs from accessing 
the courts altogether, but merely made it “not worth the expense.”81 
The dissent argued that this distinction is a betrayal of the principles 
of the effective vindication doctrine articulated in Mitsubishi and 
Randolph.82 While the dissent acknowledged that the arbitration 
clause was different from those the Court discussed in Mitsubishi and 
Randolph, it was the same in one important respect: it effectively 
 
 74. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration of the 
case. Id. at 2312 (majority opinion). 
 75. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 2316. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2317. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 2318. 
 82. Id. at 2317. 
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prohibited Plaintiffs from vindicating their claims.83 Furthermore, the 
dissent argued that the majority’s holding directly contradicted its 
opinion in Randolph, which stated that agreements that make 
arbitration prohibitively expensive violate the effective vindication 
doctrine.84 
The dissent also argued that the majority incorrectly focused on 
the fact that the arbitration agreement prohibited class actions.85 The 
relevant question was not whether the Agreement’s arbitration clause 
was unenforceable because it prohibits Plaintiffs from proceeding as 
a class, but whether it was unenforceable because it deprived 
Plaintiffs of any effective means to vindicate their claims.86 The 
dissent contended that the Agreement as a whole prevented any and 
all alternatives to class action arbitration that might otherwise be 
available to Plaintiffs.87 For example, the arbitration clause’s 
collective action waiver prevented the joinder or consolidation of 
claims.88 The Agreement’s confidentiality clause also prevented 
informal coordination among claimants who might otherwise 
collaborate on expert testimony.89 As such, the Agreement prohibited 
any form of cost sharing and effectively robbed Plaintiffs of any 
opportunity to vindicate their claims. 
Finally, Justice Kagan’s dissent challenged the majority’s 
contention that Concepcion “all but resolves this case.”90 Concepcion 
did not in any way address the effective vindication doctrine.91 
Instead, it addressed whether the FAA preempts a judge-made rule 
about the per se unconscionability of class action waivers.92 This rule 
applied regardless of whether a plaintiff had some other means of 
effectively vindicating its rights. Furthermore, Concepcion involved 
a state law, to which the effective vindication doctrine simply does 
 
 83. Id. at 2317–18. 
 84. Id. at 2318. 
 85. Id. at 2318–19. 
 86. Id. at 2318. 
 87. Id. at 2316. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 2319. 
 91. Id. at 2319–20. 
 92. Id. at 2320. 
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not apply.93 To claim that Concepcion resolves this case is to 
fundamentally misunderstand its dispositive issue. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Court’s holding effectively allows businesses to insulate 
themselves from liability for federal statutory violations through the 
use of burdensome arbitration agreements. By improperly focusing 
on the class action aspect of the Agreement’s collective action 
arbitration waiver, the Court reached a holding that renders the 
effective vindication doctrine hollow and weakens the country’s 
private enforcement regime. First, the effective vindication doctrine 
itself is a central part of Mitsubishi and is not dicta in that case.94 
Second, the Court’s holding contradicts both its own jurisprudence 
and the purpose of the effective vindication doctrine.95 This has 
implications not just for plaintiffs’ ability to prove their claims and 
be compensated but for federal enforcement regimes.96 This leaves 
potential plaintiffs with only three options. The first two are 
suggested in Italian Colors itself.97 Ultimately, however, businesses 
will be able to immunize themselves from liability by creatively 
utilizing arbitration clauses until Congress amends the FAA.98 
A.  Is the Effective Vindication Doctrine Dicta? 
Justice Scalia began his analysis of the effective vindication 
doctrine by implicitly minimizing its importance, claiming that the 
doctrine originated as dictum.99 Justice Kagan flatly denied this, 
noting that even if the doctrine was dictum in Mitsubishi, it has since 
become a principle that the Court has relied upon in its holdings.100 
Although the line between dictum and holding is not always clear, 
the principle that a contract clause preventing the effective 
vindication of a party’s right is unenforceable is not dictum in 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See infra Part III.A. 
 95. See infra Part III.B. 
 96. See infra Part III.C. 
 97. See infra Part III.D. 
 98. See infra Part III.D. 
 99. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013). 
 100. Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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Mitsubishi.101 On the contrary, it is, in the words of Justice Kagan, an 
“essential condition of the decision’s holding.”102 
In Mitsubishi the Court rejected Soler’s argument that arbitration 
clauses that require antitrust disputes to be arbitrated abroad are per 
se unenforceable.103 The Court found Soler’s argument that foreign 
arbitrators are incapable of fairly adjudicating American antitrust 
claims unpersuasive.104 In its holding, however, the Court stated that 
if Soler had actually established that its claims could not be 
effectively vindicated abroad, then the arbitration clause would be 
unenforceable.105 In other words, if the Court had concluded that 
Soler had established that the arbitration clause prevented the 
effective vindication of its claims, it would have held in favor of 
Soler instead of Mitsubishi. Therefore, the effective vindication 
doctrine is an “essential condition of the decision’s holding”106 and is 
not dictum. 
B.  The Importance of the Right to Pursue a Negative Value Claim 
The majority’s assertion that the effective vindication doctrine 
only protects plaintiffs’ rights to pursue their claims, without 
assuring an affordable means of proving them, effectively renders the 
doctrine hollow and ignores the Court’s precedent. Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning is directly contradicted by Randolph, which holds that 
arbitration clauses that make it prohibitively expensive to bring a 
claim will not be enforced.107 Moreover, a judicial doctrine that 
prohibits contracting parties from denying each other access to the 
courts, and makes proving their claims prohibitively expensive, is 
effectively meaningless.108 The Court’s holding, therefore, both 
betrays its own precedent and the purpose behind the effective 
vindication doctrine. 
 
 101. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
 102. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2317. 
 103. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 635. 
 104. Id. at 632–35. 
 105. Id. at 637. 
 106. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2317. 
 107. Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–92 (2000). 
 108. See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that a monopolist 
could find many ways around an effective vindication doctrine that is “limited to [only] baldly 
exculpatory provisions”). 
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The Court’s reasoning directly contradicts its holding in 
Randolph. This holding is important for two reasons. First, it 
establishes that if Randolph had carried her burden of establishing 
that prohibitively high arbitration costs prevented the effective 
vindication of her claims, she would have prevailed.109 Second, it 
showed no signs of differentiating between costs that are imposed to 
gain access to the court, and costs that are imposed during 
litigation.110 Although the costs the defendant imposed upon 
Randolph were filing fees, the Court’s analysis focused on the 
likelihood that Randolph would “be required to bear prohibitive 
arbitration costs” in general.111 The costs of arbitration certainly 
include a plaintiff’s costs in proving a claim, not merely filing fees 
associated with accessing the courts. As Justice Kagan pointed out, 
there is no rational basis for limiting the effective vindication 
doctrine to costs incurred by plaintiffs in pursuing a claim based on 
Randolph.112 
Even if the majority’s holding did not directly contradict 
Randolph, it did not comport with the purpose of the effective 
vindication doctrine. The effective vindication doctrine is meant to 
ensure that arbitration proceedings are “adequate to protect the rights 
[of the parties] in question so that arbitration, like the judicial 
resolution of disputes, will ‘further broader social purposes.’”113 
Without this doctrine, employers and businesses could evade basic 
federal protections, including anti-discrimination statutes.114 The 
Court’s holding effectively allows creative businesses to completely 
evade these federal protections and therefore contradicts the 
doctrine’s purpose. 
C.  Why Lack of Private Enforcement Is a Problem 
The Court’s holding also imposes further burdens on the 
country’s private enforcement regime and contravenes congressional 
 
 109. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 91–92. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 90–92. 
 112. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (arguing that the expert report “counts as a 
‘prohibitive’ cost, in Randolph’s terminology, if anything does”). 
 113. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gilmer 
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 
 114. See, e.g., id. 
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intent. Numerous federal statutes include a private right of action 
designed to supplement agency enforcement.115 This is likely 
because agency officials simply do not have the resources to regulate 
all corporate conduct.116 The Supreme Court has described at length 
the importance of such private causes of action in ensuring the 
vindication of plaintiffs’ rights.117 Moreover, the existence of a 
private cause of action serves as a strong deterrent to anticompetitive 
conduct.118 The Court’s holding effectively ignores Congress’s intent 
to supplement agency enforcement with private lawsuits in favor of 
the FAA’s preference for arbitration agreements. 
D.  The Options Left to Private Parties 
After Italian Colors, only three ways remain for plaintiffs to 
pursue their claims in the face of prohibitively burdensome 
arbitration clauses. The first is to establish that the arbitration clause 
denies the plaintiffs access to the courts entirely.119 The second is to 
prove that there was some error in the formation of the arbitration 
agreement, such as fraud or duress.120 And the third is for Congress 
to amend the FAA with language explicitly proscribing arbitration 
agreements that make it prohibitively expensive to prove a claim. 
None of these options offer a viable alternative to class-based 
procedures, and as a result, many worthwhile small claims will likely 
go unvindicated. 
Plaintiffs may be able to avoid class action waivers that make it 
prohibitively expensive to bring their claims if they can establish that 
the waivers prevent them from pursuing their claims altogether. 
 
 115. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (2012). 
 116. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979); Derek Black, Picking Up the 
Pieces After Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting A Private Cause of Action for Disparate 
Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356, 357 n.7 (2002). 
 117. See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Congress created 
the Sherman Act’s private cause of action not solely to compensate individuals, but to promote 
‘the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws.’” (quoting Lawlor v. Nat’l 
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955))). 
 118. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (“[T]he purposes 
of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present 
threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.”), 
overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984). 
 119. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
 120. Id. at 2313 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Justice Scalia’s majority opinion implied that under such 
circumstances, Mitsubishi and Randolph would be controlling, and 
the effective vindication doctrine would apply.121 For example, he 
noted that an arbitration agreement that imposes prohibitively 
expensive filing fees would presumably be unenforceable.122 Other 
costs imposed upon plaintiffs before litigation, including the cost of 
hiring an attorney, may also be included in this category. However, it 
is unlikely that plaintiffs will face such fees in the future, as 
corporate defendants can avoid this problem by simply imposing 
costs at a later stage. After all, according to Italian Colors, an 
arbitration agreement that does not prevent the pursuit of claims, but 
merely imposes prohibitive costs, will be deemed enforceable.123 
Plaintiffs could also render an arbitration agreement 
unenforceable if they can establish a defect in the formation of the 
agreement, such as fraud or duress. Justice Thomas’s concurrence 
argued, in accordance with his opinion in Concepcion, that this is the 
only ground upon which the FAA allows arbitration agreements to be 
revoked.124 However, the burden of establishing fraud or duress in 
the formation of a contract is a heavy one.125 Most plaintiffs will not 
be able to meet this burden, in part because many jurisdictions 
presume that, by signing an agreement, a party has manifested that 
she has read and understood its provisions.126 The difficulty of 
establishing this ground for revocation means that it is only an option 
in the most egregious of cases.127 
Finally, Congress could expand consumers’ access to collective 
action procedures and address Italian Colors’s holding if it amends 
 
 121. Id. at 2310–11 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 2312 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 125. See, e.g., Lauren E. Miller, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Failure of the Objective 
Theory to Promote Fairness in Language-Barrier Contracting, 43 IND. L. REV. 175, 190 (2009) 
(“Fraud is a difficult defense to prove because it generally requires a party to show ‘evidence of 
active or affirmative misrepresentation’ on the part of the other party at the time of contracting.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen GmbH, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“[A] blind or illiterate party (or simply one unfamiliar with the contract language) who 
signs the contract without learning of its contents would be bound.”); Shirazi v. Greyhound Corp., 
401 P.2d 559, 562 (Mont. 1965) (holding that an Iranian citizen with limited English had a duty 
“to acquaint himself with the contents of the” contract). 
 127. See Miller, supra note 125, at 190; see generally Miller, supra note 125 (listing 
egregious cases in which courts still held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable). 
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the FAA. For example, the FAA currently states that arbitration 
agreements are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”128 Congress could 
amend this section to allow for the invalidation of arbitration 
agreements on grounds that “exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. Under no circumstances will a collective 
action arbitration waiver that makes a claim prohibitively expensive 
to prove be enforced. This section is meant to overturn the Supreme 
Court’s holding in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant.” In order to convince Congress to take this step, 
stakeholders such as consumer advocate groups and bar associations 
will have to work together to convince their state Congress members. 
Such an amendment would effectively narrow the scope of what the 
Court considers to be the FAA’s “liberal policy in favor of 
arbitration” and allow plaintiffs to more effectively vindicate their 
rights.129 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the Court’s rush to limit the availability of class action 
procedures, it has immunized those businesses with the creativity to 
craft obstructionist arbitration clauses. Justice Kagan perfectly 
encapsulated the Court’s holding when she stated: “The Court today 
mistakes what this case is about. To a hammer, everything looks like 
a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, 
everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”130 The 
Court has not only ignored its own precedent but also congressional 
intent, and has added a powerful weapon to the arsenal of corporate 
malfeasance. 
 
 128. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 129. Campaniello Imps., Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia S.p.A., 117 F.3d 655, 665 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 130. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013). 
